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1. Introduction 
The last two decades have seen the emergence of theoretical growth models in which technological 
change is endogenous. The product-variety model by Romer (1990) and the quality-ladder model by 
Aghion and Howitt (1992) are pioneer models and the starting point for many later contributions.1 The 
major policy questions have been how an economy can sustain a positive growth rate and how 
innovation policy can enhance additional growth and welfare.  
 
Our main contribution to the existing model literature is a focus on the small, open economy case, 
where a large part of the technological change comes from abroad, while aggregate models of Romer 
(1990) and descendants (see e.g. Jones and Williams, 2000; Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth, 2005; Steger, 
2005) treat economies as closed. As in those models, we take into account that technological change 
results from profit-maximising R&D firms' output of patents that are purchased by capital producers in 
order to supply new varieties of capital equipments. Our model accounts for many of the central 
welfare arguments for subsidising innovation activities (see Jones and Williams, 2000), such as 
existence of external spillovers from previous R&D, love of capital variety in demand, and pro-
competitive increases in output that counteract the inefficiencies due to imperfect competition in the 
capital variety markets (Markusen, 1981). However, increasing the number of firms and patents will, 
in isolation, also have external negative effects through reducing output within each firm and 
increasing aggregate fixed patent costs. These are arguments for discouraging innovations.2 In addition 
to these features, we also take small, open economies' high reliance on externally given international 
prices, competition, and growth into consideration.  
 
In order to conclude quantitatively on the implications of world market exposure, we apply a 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model that can account for the complex economic settings 
within which innovation takes place. It captures interaction among markets, industrial differences in 
innovation rates, and market imperfections and policy wedges that potentially interact with innovation 
policies. The case of a small, internationally exposed economy is exemplified by the Norwegian 
economy. Previous applied macroeconomic models have not addressed similar cases. The applied 
model of Canada in Russo (2004) represents a closed economy. The pioneering CGE study by Diao et 
                                                     
1
 In addition there is a substantial literature analysing the importance of an endogenous specification of technological change 
for climate-change analysis; see Goulder and Schneider (1999), Goulder and Mathai (2000), Popp (2004), and Otto et al 
(2005). The latter formulates a CGE model based on the product-variety models of Romer (1990) and Jones (1995).  
2
 These impacts resemble, but are not the same as, the effects of creative destruction of existing goods and duplication 
externalities in patent races; see Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Jones and Williams (2000).  
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al. (1999) describes Japan as an open economy, but in several, important respects less reliant on the 
outside world than what is reasonable to assume for the Norwegian and similar small and open 
economies.  
  
One main divergence from the model of Diao et al. (1999) is our treatment of the cross-country 
knowledge spillovers. In Diao et al. (1999) the impacts of international technology are channelled 
through the domestic R&D production. All spillovers from abroad enhance the productivity of R&D 
production with non-decreasing returns to scale. Own R&D, thus, plays a decisive role for economic 
growth. According to evidence from Norwegian firms, absorption of international spillovers through 
domestic R&D is far less potent (Cappelen et al., 2007). In our model, knowledge spillovers from 
abroad, which in the benchmark are calibrated to cause about 95 per cent of the Norwegian 
technological change, are absorbed through use of all resources, where investment goods that embody 
technological improvements caused by R&D are only one type of carrier. This feature of our model 
contributes to dampen the role of R&D-stimulating policies considerably. 
 
The small, open economy focus also leads us to regard the interest rate as internationally given, in 
contrast to the closed capital market assumption in Diao et al. (1999). Export and import prices are, 
similarly, determined abroad. Capital varieties are both marketed abroad at given world market prices 
and sold in domestic markets characterised by monopolistic competition. Imports of other investment 
goods can substitute for the domestically produced capital varieties. Capital varieties are not exported 
in Diao et al. (1999), and the market power of each variety producer domestically is much larger than 
what is reasonable to assume in a small, exposed economy. 
 
As productivity externalities are related to production and use of ideas and variety capital, we analyse 
three comparable policy alternatives stimulating these processes; the first is a subsidy of R&D 
production, the second is a subsidy towards formation of variety-capital, while the third is a subsidy 
towards domestic investments in variety-capital. In several countries, including Norway, firms that 
perform R&D can withdraw a limited amount of expenses each year as tax allowances or tax credit 
(Warda, 2005, Cappelen and Soland, 2006). The R&D subsidy approximates this kind of R&D 
support. The support to investments in variety-capital illustrates policies like traditional investment tax 
credits (Goulder and Summers, 1989; Bovenberg and Goulder, 1993), or recent popular 
implementation subsidies particularly used to promote new energy and environmental technologies. 
The policy alternatives are all financed by higher lump sum taxes. 
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The small, open nature of the economy implies, as expected, far smaller welfare and growth effects of 
innovation policies than in previous studies. The main impacts of adding small, open economy 
features are less influence of own R&D and less market power. In addition, increased capital supply is 
not reinforced by a lower interest rate, a mechanism that augments growth effects within closed 
economy models. On the other hand, world market exposure is the major impetus behind the positive 
welfare and growth effects we find. The improved competitiveness obtained within variety-capital 
production when subsidising R&D and capital formation, can be exploited by increasing deliveries to 
the export markets. Consequently, merely subsidising domestic investments induces but insignificant 
growth and welfare effects, as domestic demand is relatively inelastic. The positive effects on R&D 
and production of variety-capital are, thus, strongly dampened.  
 
As opposed to the findings of Diao et al. (1999), subsidising R&D proves slightly welfare-inferior to 
subsidising formation of capital varieties, in spite of generating higher growth. Again, this is a result 
of the open economy features. The possibility of exporting variety-capital is essential for reaping high 
R&D productivity gains in case of capital subsidies. This result also illustrates the more general point 
that promoting economic growth is not necessarily welfare improving. It will depend on to what extent 
the reallocations that take place compensate or reinforce the externalities and price wedges that riddle 
the economy. Because the number of varieties increases more in case of R&D support, more 
crowding-out occurs of production and profits within each variety firm. Due to imperfect competition 
among the firms and fixed patent costs, these impacts dampen the productivity and welfare gains, in 
spite of somewhat higher spillover and love-of-variety effects.  
 
Section 2 describes the CGE model and the simulation and calibration procedures. The policy effects 
and sensitivity tests are presented and discussed in section 3, while section 4 concludes.  
2. The model 
2.1 General features 
The CGE model is a dynamic growth model with intertemporally optimising firms and households. 
The model gives a detailed industry structure with one R&D industry, one variety-capital industry 
(Romer's intermediates industry) and 16 final goods industries3 (one public, 15 private; see Appendix 
A for a list). The final goods industries also deliver goods to each other according to the empirical 
                                                     
3
 The following industries are treated exogenously: the governmental sector, the offshore production of oil, gas, and pipeline 
transport, and ocean transport.    
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input-output structure. Growth is perpetuated through dynamic spillovers from the accumulated 
knowledge induced by R&D production, though with decreasing returns as in Jones (1995). R&D 
production creates new patents, and the monopoly right of each patent represents a fixed entry cost of 
a firm that produces a separate capital variety. Due to love of capital variety, the productivity of 
variety-capital within final goods industries increases with the number of variety firms.   
 
The model fits a small, open economy and is applied for Norway. It gives a detailed description of the 
empirical tax, production and final consumption structures. Labour is perfectly mobile within the 
country, but immobile internationally. Other inputs, including investment goods, are internationally 
traded at given world market prices. Imports are modelled as imperfect substitutes for domestically 
produced goods (Armington function), while export deliveries are imperfect substitutes for home 
market deliveries (constant-elasticity of transformation (CET) technology). Both assumptions imply 
that the trade volumes are determined by the ratio of domestic to world market prices. The interest rate 
is also externally given. Financial savings are endogenously determined, subject to a non-ponzi game 
restriction that prevents foreign net wealth from exploding in the really long run. The exchange rate 
serves as numeraire.  
 
In the following, the model structure is broadly described. The public sector, which collects taxes, 
distributes transfers, and purchases goods and services from the industries and abroad, is suppressed in 
the exposition, as are the transfers and tax/subsidy wedges. Appendix C illustrates how the studied 
subsidy schemes are implemented. An extended presentation of the equations determining firm and 
household behaviour is found in Appendix B. See also Bye et al (2006)4 for a complete model 
documentation.  
2.2 Industries 
Final goods industries 
We assume that all firms within the final goods industries are identical and take the prices as given in 
the factor and goods markets, domestically as well as abroad. The technology of production in each 
firm is given by (subscript i denoting firm i is suppressed): 
(1) ( ) ( ) ( )1 , , , sH W V MX X f L K K Vρ ρ ρ τ τ τ τ + =      . 
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 Available at http://www.ssb.no/emner/10/03/doc_200611/doc_200611.pdf. 
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L, KV, KM, and V represent inputs of labour, variety-capital, other, ordinary capital, and intermediates. 
The entire nested input factor tree of Constant Elasticities of Substitution (CES) aggregates is 
presented in appendix B, figure B.1. τ denotes exogenously driven factor productivity change from 
abroad. It is assumed to be factor and industry neutral and to increase the efficient input of each factor. 
XH and XW are deliveries to the home and world markets, respectively. These markets are assumed 
segmented through a CET technology, where the transformation elasticity ρ >0 implies costs of 
diverting deliveries between the two markets. This, together with decreasing returns to scale, i.e. s < 1, 
avoids complete specialisation of production of tradeables.  
 
Each firm has perfect foresight and maximises the present value of the after-tax cash flow. By 
assuming s=1/ρ  we obtain separability between the export and home market supplies, which are set 
according to first-order conditions that equate marginal revenue with marginal costs for deliveries to 
the respective markets; see Holmøy and Hægeland (1997). The world market price is exogenous while 
the price in the domestic market is determined by market equilibrium, given the cost structure.  
 
The input of capital varieties, KVi, is represented by so-called Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz (love-of-variety) 
preferences for the variety-capital composite KV: 
(2) ( )( ) ( )11
0
kv
kv kv
kv
R
V ViK K di
σ
σσ
σ
−− 
=   ∫ . 
R is the accumulated number of capital varieties (and firms in the variety-capital industry), and σkv is 
the uniform elasticity of substitution applying to all pairs of capital varieties. The more varieties, the 
higher is the variety-capital productivity within final goods industries.  
Production of R&D services 
The R&D industry delivers new patents to domestic capital variety firms that wish to enter the variety-
capital industry.5 The production of new patents in one time period, HRX , is given by:      
(3) [ ] ( )1 , , ssHR MX R f L K Vτ τ τ=    . 
                                                     
5
 The model does not disregard international trade in ideas, but trade in ideas is encompassed in the trade of capital varieties 
(see below).    
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The same nested CES production technology as for the final goods industries applies, apart from that 
the R&D industry does not use the differentiated capital composite, Kv.6 As for the final goods 
production, the exogenous change in τ captures absorption of international technological change. In 
addition, productivity is enhanced by endogenous domestic spillovers that are freely accessible by all 
incumbent and potential patent producers. These originates from the accumulated stock of knowledge, 
R, embodied in patents, so that 1
H
RR R X−= + .  s1 denotes the elasticity with respect to these domestic 
spillovers. 
 
All firms within the R&D industry are identical and take the prices as given in factor and output 
markets. Each firm has perfect foresight and maximises the present value of the after-tax cash flow. 
This gives first-order conditions that equate domestic prices with marginal costs.  
Production of capital varieties  
Each capital variety-producing firm buys one patent from the R&D industry as a fixed establishment 
cost, and produce one capital variety based on the patent. We assume that the cost structure is identical 
for all the firms within the industry. As for the R&D industry, we exclude variety-capital as a 
production factor. We allow for deliveries both to the domestic and the export markets with the same 
assumptions about separability in the cost structure between deliveries to the two markets as for the 
final goods industries. Technological change from abroad is accounted for through the τ 's, and we, 
therefore, do not allow for additional productivity growth through import of capital varieties. 
However, other ordinary machinery capital, which is a relatively near substitute, is imported; see the 
nested CES structure in Appendix B, figure B.1. 
 
The variety firms have market power in the domestic market, but exhibit no market power in the 
export market, where prices are externally given. This is a reasonable assumption for a small and open 
economy.7 Each firm has perfect foresight and maximises the present value of the after-tax cash flow. 
This gives the following first-order conditions for deliveries to the world and home markets, WkiX and 
H
kiX :  
(4) ( )1 sW W sk kicP X
s
−
=   
                                                     
6
 This choice is made to avoid cumulative multiplicators of the love-of-variety effect.   
7
 Section 3.4 provides sensitivity analyses with endogenous world market price for capital varieties. 
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(5) ( )1 sH H ski ki kicP m X
s
−
= . 
For deliveries to the export market the world market price WkP  equals marginal costs where c denotes 
the unit input costs. In the home market, the monopoly price of capital variety i, HkiP , is set as a mark- 
up, mki, on costs. 1
ki
ki
ki
m
ε
ε
=
−
, and εki is the domestic demand elasticity for capital varieties. The 
variety composite is used as input in the final goods industries. The mark-up factor is independent of i, 
since the demand elasticity is equal to the constant elasticity of substitution between the different 
varieties (see e.g. Bye et al., 2006). This, together with the assumption of equal production and cost 
structure in each firm and the monopoly-pricing rule, implies that the price in the domestic market is 
equal for all the capital varieties, and each variety is produced in equal quantities.  
 
From the value maximisation of the representative firm, while using the fact that profit is equal for all 
firms, it tπ π= , the entry condition for each capital variety-producing firm can be deduced: 
(6) ( )0
0
H rt
R tP e dtπ
∞
−
= ∫ . 
0
H
RP  is the fixed entry cost of buying one patent from the R&D industry in period 0. Firms are entering 
the capital variety industry until the representative firm’s total discounted net profit is equal to the 
entry costs. In each period, new patents are produced and new firms will enter the variety-capital 
industry. The entry condition determines the price of a new patent in each period. Given that a firm 
has entered, the first-order condition in eq. (5) determines the domestic price of the capital variety for 
given marginal costs and demand.  
2.3 Consumer behaviour 
Consumption and saving result from the decision of an infinitely lived representative consumer that 
maximises intertemporal utility with perfect foresight. The consumer chooses a consumption path 
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint that requires the present value of consumption not to 
exceed total wealth (current non-human wealth plus the present value of labour income and net 
transfers). Labour supply is exogenous. We assume that the consumer's rate of time preferences equals 
the exogenously given nominal interest rate for the entire time path. Total consumption is allocated 
across 10 different goods and services according to a nested CES structure. The structure is given in 
figure B.2 in Appendix B. 
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2.4 Equilibrium conditions 
The model is characterised by equilibrium in each period in all product markets and the labour market. 
Intertemporal equilibrium requires fulfilment of two transversality conditions: the limit values of the 
total discounted values of net foreign debt and of real capital, respectively, must both be zero. The 
model is characterised by a path-dependent balanced growth path solution (or steady state solution), 
see Sen and Turnovsky (1989) for a theoretical exposition. This implies that both the path and the 
long-run stationary solution differ between simulated scenarios. 
 
To ensure a long-run balanced growth path, the following conditions must be fulfilled: 1) The rate of 
technological change for each input factor in each industry must converge to the same rate, gs, so that 
each industry grows at the same rate. 2) The growth in per capita consumption equals the same rate, gs. 
3) The population growth rate is constant. Along the transitional path the growth rate may vary. See 
Bye et al (2006) for further details.  
 
A balanced growth path also requires that the following equation is fulfilled: 
(7) ( )( )
( )
( ) 11 11
1
dsg
r
p
σθ −
  +  = +
+  + 
 
θ  is the rate of time preferences, r is the nominal interest rate, p is the growth rate of the consumer 
price index, and  σd  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Together with equation (7), the 
transversality condition regarding net foreign debt is fulfilled when the consumer finds the optimal 
level of consumption, given the intertemporal budget constraint and the transversality condition. 
Correspondingly, the transversality condition for the value of real capital is a restriction on the 
determination of net investments by firms. 
2.5 Data and parameters 
The model is calibrated to the 2002 Norwegian National Accounts. The elasticities of substitution in 
the production technology range from 0.15 at the upper part of the nested tree to 0.5 further down in 
the nested tree structure, see Appendix B, figure B.1, and are in the range of empirical findings 
(Andreassen and Bjertnæs, 2006). We have less empirical foundation for the substitution possibilities 
within the composite of variety-capital and ordinary machinery capital. We assume a relatively high 
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substitution elasticity of 1.5, while the elasticity between the different capital varieties is expected to 
be even higher and set to 3.0, giving a mark-up factor of 1.5 for the domestic price of capital varieties.8  
 
The elasticities of scale are equal to 0.83 in all industries, and fit econometric findings of moderate 
decreasing returns to scale in Norwegian firms (Klette, 1999). The scale elasticity is at the lower end 
of the estimates by Klette (1999), but is chosen in order to avoid unrealistic industrial specialisation 
patterns.9 This implies that the elasticities of transformation between domestic and foreign deliveries 
are equal to 5. The elasticities of substitution between domestic products and imported goods are 
assumed equal to 4.10  The elasticity of scale related to previous knowledge is equal to 0.5, in order to 
ensure decreasing spillover effects of the knowledge base, supported by both theoretical and empirical 
findings (see Jones, 1995; 1999; Leahy and Neary, 1999). 
2.6 Exogenous assumptions and balanced growth 
The exogenous growth factors are assumed to grow at a constant rate. In most cases rates are set in 
accordance with the average, annual growth estimates in the baseline scenario of Norwegian Ministry 
of Finance (2004) that reports the governmental economic perspectives until 2050. In the 
governmental perspectives, total factor productivity growth is entirely exogenous and valued at, on 
average, 1.0 per cent annually. Our model distinguishes between an exogenous and an endogenous 
component. In line with empirical findings; see e.g. Coe and Helpman (1995) and Keller (2004), we 
ascribe 95 per cent of the long-run domestic total factor productivity growth to exogenous diffusion of 
international technological change.11 The long run in this context is 50-70 years from now, where the 
reference path obtains a stable growth period. The assumed 5 per cent growth resulting from domestic 
R&D in this period forms a basis for calibrating the 2002 level of knowledge, R0, which together with 
                                                     
8
 This is in line with the Jones and Williams (2000) computations that exclude creative destruction (similarly to our model).  
Numerical specifications of Romer's Cobb Douglas production functions, as in Diao et al. (1999), Lin and Russo (2002), and 
Steger (2005), result in far larger markups. Markups of 1.5 are nevertheless in the upper bound of econometric estimates 
(Norrbin, 1993; Basu, 1996). Our main motivation for staying in the upper bound area is that we model industrial R&D as 
outsourced to a separate R&D industry. Thus, R&D costs are ascribed to this R&D industry, whereas the marginal costs of 
final industries exclude this part of the costs. This deviates from typical regressions of markups, where marginal costs include 
all observed costs, including industrial R&D costs. Another, more technical, reason for our relatively high markups is that the 
capital varieties represent a small share of machinery capital and thus of total inputs. This, in isolation, drives the markups 
required to calibrate the model upwards.    
9
 Because ρ=1/s, a larger elasticity of scale will imply a larger elasticity of transformation between domestic and foreign 
deliveries, σ=1/(1-ρ). If the elasticity of scale is close to 1 (constant returns to scale), the elasticity of transformation will be 
very high, implying practically no dispersion between domestic and foreign deliveries.  
10
 These parameters values correspond to similar parameter values in the MSG6-model, a traditional applied CGE model for 
the Norwegian economy, Heide et al (2004), 
11
 This lies in upper bound of estimates for small, open countries like the Norwegian. We choose that, as several mechanisms 
believed to drive domestic innovations are excluded from the model, like basic, governmental research, endogenous 
education, and learning-by doing.  
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the remaining parameters of the model determines the productivity growth from domestic knowledge 
accumulation. The population growth is set to 0.4 per cent annually, in accordance with the 
expectations in Norwegian Ministry of Finance (2004). Exogenous activities, like public consumption 
and output, are also set in accordance with the governmental perspectives. The exogenous levels of 
offshore investments and oil and gas exports result from a smoothing of their expected present values 
in the governmental perspectives. The smoothing is made to account for the economic significance of 
the Norwegian oil and gas resources without introducing another source of dynamics into the growth 
path.  
 
World market prices are assumed to increase 1.4 per cent annually. This is in the lower range of 
exogenous price growth estimates in the governmental perspectives. The export price of capital 
varieties is assumed to rise even more slowly, in line with the domestic price increase of 0.6 percent 
annually on average for the capital varieties. Lower-bound estimates are chosen to let exogenous 
inflationary impulses be more in line with internal impulses, which are dampened by the consumption-
smoothing features of the model. This provides us with endogenous developments of the delivery 
ratios between the export and domestic markets that are more in line with those of the governmental 
perspectives. The international nominal interest rate is 4 per cent. All policy variables are constant in 
real terms at their 2002 levels. 
 
In the long run, i.e. 50-70 years from now, the stable GDP growth rate of the reference path amounts 
to 1.5 percent annually; that of consumption is 0.5 percentage points lower, as net export is increasing 
more in this period. The growth rates of the activities driving the domestic growth impetus, R&D and 
variety-capital production, are relatively high (3.5 and 3.1 per cent annually). As the endogenous 
growth is assumed to asymptotically approach zero, in line with the non-scale growth assumption 
(Jones, 1995), the growth in steady state will only depend on exogenous drivers. For technical reasons, 
we have set all exogenous and endogenous growth drivers to zero in the far future (after about 100 
years). This ensures that the economy is eventually on a balanced growth path (steady state) and that 
this growth path, with zero growth, satisfies the transversality conditions described in section 2.4. In 
particular, equation (7) then implies that r=θ at all points in time.12  
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 We have tested the significance of this assumption by varying at what time the zero growth is imposed. The relative effects 
of the different policy analyses appear independent of this timing, as do the growth rates within the stable period. Only the 
durability of the stable period is affected.  
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3. Policy analyses and numerical results 
We explore the welfare and growth outcomes of innovation incentives. by simulating three distinct 
policy alternatives: an R&D subsidy, a subsidy towards capital formation, and a subsidy towards 
domestic investments in variety-capital. All the policy alternatives are implemented in the first year of 
simulation and kept constant during the rest of the simulation period; see Appendix C for the 
modelling of the subsidies. To make the three distinct policy alternatives comparable, the ad valorem 
subsidy rates are dimensioned so that the annuities of the subsidy amounts become equal. 13 The public 
revenue annuity is approximately 250 million , which is about 1.5 times larger than today’s value of 
the Norwegian tax credit system for R&D expenses. The resulting ad valorem subsidy rates for the 
three subsidy schemes will depend on their subsidy bases; see table 1. 
 
We report the long run effects 70 years from now, when the economy has obtained stable growth rates 
and before the endogenous growth is emptied out. Both long-run consumption and the discounted 
consumption over all periods, including the transition and balanced growth path, are given. The latter 
measures welfare. The effects of the different policy alternatives, mostly measured as deviations from 
the reference path, are given in table 1.  
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 See Bye et al. (2006) for the intertemporal solving algorithm. 
14 
Table 1. Policy alternatives, long run effects, percentage deviations from the reference path 
Policy alternative R&D subsidy Capital 
subsidy 
Investment 
subsidy 
Subsidy rate* 5.20 1.25 4.14 
Price of patents  -8.38 -0.15 -0.33 
Production of patents  45.40 23.27 5.86 
Price of capital varieties  -0.97 -1.23 -3.51 
Production of variety-capital  
    Domestic 
    Export 
Production in each variety firm 
    Domestic 
    Export 
17.30 
13.53 
18.69 
 
-8.28 
-4.11 
11.79 
7.24 
13.46 
 
-3.77 
1.80 
2.81 
4.47 
2.22 
 
1.45 
-0.72 
GDP  1.90 1.17 0.27 
GDP, growth rate** 0.07 0.04 0.01 
Total consumption  0.22 0.28 0.00 
Consumer price index 0.74 0.52 0.12 
Composite price of capital varieties  -10.36 -5.82 -3.79 
Composite used in ord. machinery prod. 14.40 8.04 4.68 
Nominal wage rate  1.43 0.94 0.25 
Total export 3.11 2.25 0.35 
Total import  2.81 2.08 0.37 
Private R&D/GDP*** 1.9 1.6 1.4 
Welfare 0.32 0.33 0.02 
*The exogenous, constant rate in the policy scenarios (per cent)  
** Absolute deviation from reference path 
*** Share in the policy scenarios (per cent) 
3.1 R&D subsidy 
Effects on production of R&D and variety-capital 
The subsidy given to production of new patents amounts to an ad valorem rate of 5.20 per cent, and 
has the direct effect of shifting marginal costs of R&D production downwards. For a given patent 
price, supply increases, and for the capital variety industry to be able to absorb more patents, the price 
must fall. The marginal willingness to pay for patents is determined by the discounted profit for the 
last new firm entering the capital industry, and it falls as a result of reduced production and, thus, 
profit within each firm. The marginal costs of the R&D firms will be further shifted downwards as a 
result of dynamic, positive spillover effects from the accumulated knowledge stock, and this reinforces 
the partial market dynamics. In long-run equilibrium, the R&D production increases considerably, by 
15 
45.40 per cent. In terms of the R&D intensity, this increase meets the expressed goal of the Norwegian 
government of increasing the private R&D/GDP ratio to 2 per cent, from a long-run ratio of 1 per cent 
in the reference scenario.  The profit within each capital variety-producing firm is reduced and is 
mirrored by the patent price fall of 8.38 per cent compared to the reference. The number of capital 
variety firms increases by 17.30 per cent.  
 
In the domestic market for variety-capital, the demand faced by each variety firm shifts downwards as 
the number of varieties increases. This contributes to reduce both the mark-up price and the domestic 
production of each variety. In the long-run equilibrium, the domestic prices of capital varieties fall by 
0.97 per cent and domestic deliveries from each firm by 8.28 per cent. Also export deliveries fall, 
though less, since the export prices are unchanged. Even though export from each firm falls by 4.11 
per cent, the aggregate export market supply of variety-capital increases markedly. Due to the 
increased number of firms, exports increase by 18.69 per cent. In the domestic markets, where there is 
love of capital variety in demand, increased number of patents will increase the efficiency of using the 
capital composite and amplify the price reduction. In long-run equilibrium, the domestic price of the 
capital composites falls by 10.36 per cent, and demand is stimulated.  The use of the composite does 
for instance increase by 14.4 per cent for the industry producing other, ordinary machinery goods. 
Reallocation, growth, and welfare  
The results reported above for the innovative industries producing R&D and variety-capital, as well as 
results for all remaining industries, are influenced by indirect changes in all factor markets. The 
subsidies increase the demand in both the R&D industry and the variety-capital industry for other 
inputs, like labour, intermediates and other investment goods. This, combined with higher final 
consumption, contributes to a rise in all other factor prices than variety-capital. The wage increase in 
the long run amounts to 1.43 per cent and is a result of both higher demand and increased productivity 
of labour due to higher production of R&D and capital varieties. For most of the remaining products 
the unit costs of production increase, and export and home market deliveries fall, both in the short and 
long run. One exception is home market deliveries of other capital goods like ordinary machinery 
capital, buildings and constructions that increase somewhat due to the higher demand from the 
innovative industries. 
 
Growth is negative for the non-innovative part of the economy. This is true in spite of the enhanced 
variety-capital productivity resulting from more varieties. Nevertheless, the growth in GDP rises, 
because the expansion of the R&D and variety-capital industries dominates. The economy reaches a 
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new and higher stable growth rate; see figure 1. Long-run GDP increases by 1.90 per cent and the 
growth rate is 0.07 percentage points higher.14  
 
Figure 1.  The development in GDP growth rates; reference and policy alternatives; percentage 
points 
 
 
Welfare, measured as discounted consumption in each period, increases by 0.32 per cent. The main 
contributions to the welfare gain originate from the increased R&D and variety-capital production 
through the following two channels: the positive spillover effect in production of patents of a larger 
knowledge stock, and the positive love-of-variety effect in the demand for variety-capital as the 
number of capital varieties increases. These are counteracted by two negative welfare contributions: 
the welfare loss through lower production within each monopoly firm producing capital varieties, and 
the negative contribution from higher overall fixed entry costs in terms of patent expenditures (for a 
given patent price). 
 
                                                     
14
 Domestic gross product, GDP, includes return from the factors labour, capital and knowledge. GDP is measured exclusive 
of the exogenous, offshore petroleum production.  
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In the presence of various distortions in the economy, other reallocations may also affect efficiency 
and welfare. One negative contribution to welfare stems from the fact that savings fall, in spite of 
considerable capital accumulation, in particular of variety-capital. As opposed to closed economy 
models, national savings are separated from capital investments by the possibility of financial saving 
and borrowing. We find a higher rise of consumption during the first 40 periods than in the long run. 
This reflects a considerable fall in financial savings that renders total savings in the transitional path 
lower than in the reference. As capital income taxation drives a wedge between private and social 
returns to capital, savings are too low from an intertemporal efficiency point of view, and the 
reduction of savings reinforce this inefficiency.  
 
Though different analytical designs exclude accurate comparisons, it is clear that the quantitative 
effects on growth and welfare of subsidising the R&D industry are much smaller in our analysis than 
in applied studies of larger and more closed economies, like in Diao et al. (1999) and Russo (2004). A 
main explanation is our allowance for a dominating role of external, international productivity growth, 
which in the reference path accounts for 95 per cent of domestic growth. In contrast, domestic 
processes account for all TFP growth in the previous CGE studies, as in existing theoretical 
contributions.  In addition, the applied analyses referred to assume stronger love of capital variety, 
which reinforces productivity gains of patent production. Their results are also influenced by 
endogenous and falling interest rates that spur savings and investments. Diao et al. (1999) include non-
decreasing spillover effects of knowledge accumulation, which contributes to their welfare and growth 
effects. 
3.2 Capital subsidy 
Effects on production of R&D and variety-capital 
A subsidy offered to all the producers of capital varieties, independent of whether the firms already 
exist or wish to enter, is equivalent to a downward shift in their cost curves. The annual ad valorem 
subsidy rate to production comparable with the R&D subsidy above is 1.25 per cent. These cost shifts 
explain the increase in the intra-firm deliveries to the export markets, which in the long term amount 
to 1.80 per cent. In the domestic markets, the cost reductions are reflected in a 1.23 per cent lower 
variety price. However, in spite of cost reductions, the intra-firm deliveries are 3.77 per cent lower in 
the long run than in the reference path. This is explained first of all by a simultaneous downward shift 
in the demand facing each variety producer as a consequence of an increased number of competing 
firms. The entry of new firms is a result of changes in the patent market. First, higher profits for the 
capital variety producers shift the demand for new patents upwards. Second, the stimulation of patent 
18 
production induces spillovers that bring about dynamic productivity gains within firms. Both these 
shifts stimulate long-run patent production, which increases by 23.27 per cent in the new equilibrium. 
This is, however, only 60 per cent of the R&D expansion obtained in the R&D subsidy alternative, 
while the long-run private R&D/GDP ratio is 1.6, which is 85 per cent of the ratio in the previous 
alternative. In long run equilibrium, the price of the patent is reduced by 0.15 per cent, reflecting that 
the productivity gains of the spillovers in the long run dominate the price pull of higher willingness to 
pay among variety firms.   
 
As for the R&D subsidy alternative, the aggregate supply of variety-capital increases and, again, it is 
almost entirely explained by more firms. The output increase is less pronounced than in the former 
alternative. The sum of exports from all firms increases by 13.46 per cent, or about 70 per cent of the 
R&D subsidy result. The efficient supply of variety-capital in the domestic market, which includes the 
positive love-of-variety impact, increases. For example, the deliveries to the industry producing 
ordinary machinery goods increase by 8.04 per cent. The output rise reflects a reduction in the 
domestic price of the composite of 5.82 per cent. However, this fall is not more than 50 per cent of the 
fall obtained in the R&D subsidy alternative. This is primarily explained by weaker productivity gains 
within patent production, and also by weaker love-of-variety effects when number of varieties 
increases less. 
Reallocation, growth, and welfare  
As for the R&D subsidy, stimulating the production of capital varieties through a direct capital subsidy 
increases the demand for other inputs from the innovative industries producing variety-capital and 
R&D. But since their expansion is weaker in the present policy alternative, the factor prices and unit 
costs increase less. The wage rate increases by 0.94 per cent. The reallocations, and subsequent 
productivity effects, are qualitatively similar, but weaker, than in the R&D subsidy case. Total gross 
product increases by 1.17 per cent due to the value added increase in the innovative part of the 
economy. The growth rate of GDP is 0.04 percentage points higher than in the reference path, which is 
lower than in the R&D policy alternative; see figure 1.  
 
In spite of weaker growth effects, the welfare gain of 0.33 per cent compared to the reference path is 
slightly higher than in the former alternative. It reflects a higher consumption in the long run. A 
significantly smaller drop in intra-firm deliveries to the home markets is an important explanation. 
This reallocation contributes to improved welfare because of the mark-up pricing domestically. In his 
welfare study of long-run balanced growth paths, Steger (2005) also emphasises imperfect competition 
in the capital markets as a highly significant distortion. However, during the transition path we find 
19 
that consumption is far less affected. The higher efficiency contribution from more intra-firm 
production in variety firms is nearly offset by markedly weaker short-run productivity gains from both 
the R&D spillovers and the love of capital variety. This difference between the two alternatives is less 
pronounced in the later periods, due to the diminishing returns to the scale of R&D. The discrepancy 
we find between short and long run effects points to the importance of not disregarding the transitional 
path in welfare considerations.  
 
The intertemporal development of consumption reflects that total savings are higher in this alternative 
than in the R&D subsidy alternative. This means a smaller intertemporal efficiency loss related to the 
capital income taxation. Imports develop more slowly in the transition path. This is most prominent in 
case of investment good imports, which is driven to a large extent by the demand from R&D and 
variety production. As a result, the economy builds up a lower level of net foreign debt than in the 
R&D subsidy alternative, and consumption is less crowded out by a need to export in the long run in 
order to serve debt.  
3.3 Subsidy to domestic investments in variety-capital 
Effects on production of R&D and variety-capital 
A subsidy offered to domestic purchases of variety-capital will act similarly to a subsidy towards the 
part of the capital production that is destined for the domestic markets. While this distinction is not 
topical in previous analyses of closed markets, our international market setting allows us to distinguish 
between this alternative and the former alternative, where also capital supplies for the export market 
are subsidised. The subsidy, implemented as a rate of 4.15 per cent of the domestic purchaser price, is 
equivalent to a downward shift in the costs of domestic deliveries for both existing producers and 
possible new entrants. As a result, the domestic variety price decreases by 3.51 per cent in the long 
run, which is significantly more than in the former alternative where the same subsidy amount covers 
all deliveries irrespective of destination. The intra-firm deliveries to the home markets increase 
somewhat, as opposed to the former alternative, where they were crowded out by a larger number of 
firms. However, a larger home-market production within firms comes at the expense of intra-firm 
exports, which falls by 0.72 per cent. Also in this policy alternative, lower costs and higher profits for 
the capital variety producers shift the demand for new patents upwards, though not to the same extent 
as in the former alternatives. The production of patents increases and induces dynamic spillover 
effects and downward cost shifts for the variety producers. In the long run, R&D production increases 
by 5.86 per cent. The long-run price of patents also falls, by 0.33 per cent, primarily explained by the 
dynamic spillovers. 
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Similarly to the other two policy alternatives, this subsidy stimulates aggregate supply of variety-
capital, both at home and abroad. But the output effects are smaller, because the number of firms 
increases less. Export production increases by 2.22 per cent, only. The increase indicates that in spite 
of reduced exports from each variety firm, there is a positive international competitiveness effect for 
the industry at large, due first of all to the reduced patent costs. At home, the industry's deliveries 
increase more. In efficiency units, i.e. inclusive of the love-of-variety effects, the deliveries to the 
ordinary machinery industry do, for example, increase by 4.68 per cent. This reflects a domestic price 
reduction of the variety-capital composite of 3.79 per cent.   
Reallocation, growth, and welfare 
As with the other policy alternatives, a domestic investment subsidy increases the demand for inputs in 
both the variety-capital industry and the R&D industry. Factor prices increase, implying higher 
production costs for all industries. Output reductions occur within all industries except R&D, variety-
capital, and ordinary capital production, but the effects are smaller than in the other policy alternatives. 
The growth and total welfare effects are negligible. Growth first of all relies on R&D expansion, 
which is small in this alternative. Also the welfare gains released in the former alternatives largely 
relate to R&D expansion. Relatively less R&D spillovers and love-of-variety effects in this investment 
subsidy alternative reduce the welfare gain. These effects are not sufficiently compensated by a 
favourable stimulation of domestic deliveries from each firm, which tend to increase efficiency within 
the imperfectly competitive markets. As opposed to models with no entry (see e.g. Hertel, 1994 or 
Greaker and Rosendahl, 2006 for a recent, numerical application), such pro-competitive effects are not 
obtained within the other policy alternatives, even though domestic deliveries increase. When R&D or 
variety production are subsidised, entry in the variety-capital industry crowds out intra-firm output and 
is, in this sense, anti-competitive. 
 
All in all, subsidising only domestic investments induces but insignificant growth and welfare effects, 
as domestic demand is relatively inelastic. The positive effects on R&D and production of variety-
capital are, thus, strongly dampened. 
3.4 Sensitivity analyses 
The quantitative estimates of growth and welfare effects rely on the chosen parameters. In addition, 
our computations indicate that the possibility of expanding production by exploiting the world markets 
for variety-capital plays a crucial role. We have performed sensitivity analyses regarding the spillover 
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parameter in the R&D production function, the mark-up factor in the markets for capital varieties, as 
well as in the world market assumptions with respect to variety-capital demand.  
Changes in spillover parameter and mark-up factor 
We test the effects on the policy results of a 2 per cent increase/decrease in the spillover parameter s1 
and the mark-up factor mki.  The results from the sensitivity analyses are measured as percentage 
deviation from the base policy scenarios and given in table 2. Reducing the spillover parameter lowers 
the effect on growth and welfare compared to the base policy alternatives. The same is the case with 
lower mark-up factor. The results are symmetric such that increasing the spillover parameter and the 
mark-up factor both contribute to higher economic growth and welfare.  
 
The main conclusion to draw from these tests is that the rankings of the policy scenarios are robust to 
the parameter changes; see table 2. In particular, in all tests the capital subsidy continues to be slightly 
welfare-superior to the R&D subsidy. In table 2, only long-run effects on consumption are reported. 
The short-run effects are nearly similar to the base policy scenarios, so that the long-run results are 
representative for the changes in welfare.  
 
Table 2:  Sensitivity results of changing the spillover parameter and the mark-up; percentage 
deviation from the base policy scenarios, long run effects 
Policy alternatives R&D subsidy Capital subsidy 
Senstitivity test Spillover Mark-up Spillover Mark-up 
Parameter value 0.49 0.51 1.47 1.53 0.49 0.51 1.47 1.53 
GDP -0.51 0.53 -0.34 0.33 -0.43 0.47 -0.31 0.30 
GDP, growth rate* -0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.02 
Long run consumption -0.04 0.04 -0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.05 0.05 
* Absolute deviation from the base policy scenarios 
Changes in export market assumptions for variety-capital production 
The test of the world market assumptions is performed by letting the export price of variety-capital 
evolve similarly to the domestic price.  The share of deliveries destined for the world markets will be 
unaltered in this alternative.  
 
The sensitivity analyses confirm that the small and open economy benefits significantly from 
reallocations of deliveries towards export markets for variety-capital. When such reallocations are 
prohibited through equal percentage developments in prices and deliveries within the home and world 
markets, productivity gains cannot to the same extent be exploited by exporting. The loss of 
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productivity gains due to reduced R&D and variety production comes on top of considerable terms of 
trade losses when export prices of variety-capital is linked to falling home prices. As a result, the 
effects of policy on long-run growth rates, consumption, and welfare are considerably dampened 
compared to the case with exogenous world market prices. Table 3 reports the results as percentage 
deviations from the reference path. In the alternative with domestic investment subsidies, the welfare 
and growth effects are even reversed compared to the reference path, and investment subsidies render 
welfare-deteriorating.  
 
Table 3.  Sensitivity to assuming that the export price of capital varieties evolves as the 
domestic price, percentage deviations from the reference path, long run effects 
Policy alternative R&D subsidy    Capital subsidy Investment subsidy 
Subsidy rate* 5.20         1.25 4.14 
GDP 1.05 0.08 -2.05 
GDP, growth rate** 0.03 0.00 -0.05 
Welfare  0.10 -0.02 -0.95 
*The exogenous rate in the sensitivity scenarios (per cent). 
** Absolute deviation from the reference path. 
4. Concluding remarks 
Most previous studies conclude that current levels of R&D are inefficiently low from a 
macroeconomic perspective and that policy intervention is needed. However, there exist mechanisms 
that support the opposite conclusion, and whether and why R&D activity is suboptimal are country-
specific questions that call for realistic macro-economic modelling. This study examines the case of 
small, open economies by means of a detailed CGE model that can account for interplays among 
markets and relevant endogenous and external mechanisms. After two decades of intensive research 
on the theoretical and empirical foundations of technological change, we believe that time is ripe for 
integrating the new knowledge within consistent, empirical macroeconomic frameworks that take 
short and long run effects of innovation policies into account. Until now, contributions have been 
scarce. 
 
As expected, the clearest implication of the small, open economy case is that growth and welfare 
effects of subsidising innovation are much smaller than in applied analyses of larger, more closed 
economies. Much technological development is reaped only by absorption from abroad, and unless 
absorptive capacity is heavily reliant on domestic R&D or other domestic decisions, there are limits to 
growth and welfare impacts of domestic innovation policies. 
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Nevertheless, we find that innovation policy matters, and in the present setting it increases growth and 
welfare, in accordance with most econometric evidence. The policy design is, however, crucial for the 
results. In our small, open economy case, we find that most of the growth and welfare effects rely on 
the possibility of exporting new technology, thus the most efficient policy alternatives are those 
succeeding in promoting such exports. However, policies should also stimulate technology deliveries 
at home, due to market power inefficiencies and productivity potentials of variety in the domestic 
markets.   
 
Our study indicates that the current policies directed towards private R&D are insufficient for reaching 
the proclaimed goal of the Norwegian government of an aggregate private R&D/GDP ratio of 2 per 
cent. We find, not surprisingly, that the most efficient instrument for reaching this goal is to intensify 
direct subsidies to private R&D. According to our computations, a 50 per cent increase in today’s 
general R&D support increases the private R&D intensity to the desired level. However, importantly, 
higher R&D intensity and growth is not necessarily welfare enhancing. We find that subsidies towards 
capital formation generate lower R&D intensity and growth, but nevertheless they prove slightly 
welfare superior to a direct R&D subsidy. This is not a general result, but depends on the relative 
strengths of the existing inefficiences within the economy. Sensitivity tests do, however, indicate that 
the result is robust within the economic setting we study.  
 
There are several potentials for adding features into the model that are empirically significant and 
relevant to the effects of innovation policies. First of all, the assumptions about the labour supply have 
crucial interactions with innovation policies. The present model assumes one national labour market 
with exogenous, unaltered supply among the policy alternatives. The welfare potential of innovation 
policy is restricted by limited resources, in particular the inflexible labour endowments. Expansion of 
the R&D industry is likely to attract mainly high-skilled labour. In reality, thus, the allocating effects 
of more innovation would be to crowd out skill-intensive industries, in particular, and not all labour-
intensive activities as in the present framework. Distinguishing between different skill levels would be 
an interesting extension of the model. So would accounting for labour supply responses. As there are 
significant labour tax wedges in most developed economies, including Norway, stimulating labour 
supply would add an extra welfare-improving allocation effect of innovation policies. It would also 
introduce a significant difference between lump sum and other taxation and, thus, the possibility to 
study more realistic financing schemes than in the present study. Other important questions related to 
labour supply is whether the educational composition of the labour force would respond to innovation 
policies, and how education policies would interact with innovation policies. All these interactions 
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cannot be addressed within our present framework. Public R&D and its interaction with private R&D 
are other policy areas excluded in this study. All these would be interesting extensions.  
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1: Production Activities  
Other Products and Services 
Manufacture of Metals 
Polluting Transport Services 
Non Polluting Transport Services 
Research and development (R&D) 
Transport Oils 
Heating Fuels 
Variety-capital 
Other Ordinary Machinery 
Building of Ships, Oil Drilling Rigs, Oil Production Platforms etc. 
Construction, excl. of Oil Well Drilling 
Ocean Transport - Foreign, Services in Oil and Gas Exploration 
Crude Oil 
Natural Gas 
Pipeline Transport of Oil and Gas 
Production of Electricity 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 
Government Input Activities 
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Appendix B 
The model structure of firm and household behaviour 
When firm notation i is suppressed, all variables in the equation apply to firm i. Subscripts denoting 
industry is also suppressed for most variables. Subscript 0, -1, or t denote period. When period 
specification is absent, all variables apply to the same period. Compared to the exposition in Section 2, 
we disregard inputs of intermediate goods. In consumption, i denotes good i,  j denotes CES composite 
j.  
B.1 Production of final goods 
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B.2 Production of ideas 
Eqs. (B.1) and (B.8) apply to firms within the R&D industry. In addition, the following structure 
describes the industry:  
(B.2')  R RH HP X wLπ = −  
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B.3 Production of capital varieties 
For firms producing capital varieties, eq. (B.2) applies, in addition to the following: 
(B.1'')  ( )0 0 0 0
0
rt K H J
i it t it R iPV e P K dt P P Kπ
∞
−
= − − +∫   
(B.3'')   ( ) ( ) ( )1 , sH Wki ki i MiX X f L Kρ ρ ρ τ τ + =       
(B.4'')   ( ) ( )1 1W Hs si ki kiC c X X = +    
(B.5'')   ( ) ( ) ( )1 1' H H H H W W Ws si ki ki ki ki k ki kiP X X c X P X c Xπ = − + −  
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(B.13) 
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B.4 Consumer behaviour 
(B.16) ( )0
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−
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B.5 Variable list 
0PV  The present value of the representative firm  
π  Operating profit  
JP  Price index of the investment good composite  
J  Gross investment  
KP  User cost index of capital composite  
K  Capital composite 
XH Output of final good firm delivered to the domestic market  
XW Output of final good firm delivered to the export market 
PH Domestic market price index of final good  
PW World market price index of final good 
W Wage rate 
L  Labour  
τ  Factor productivity change through international spillovers 
VK  Variety-capital  
MK  Other ordinary capital 
S Scale elasticity 
ρ Transformation parameter between deliveries to the domestic and the foreign market 
C The variable cost function  
c  Price index of the CES-aggregate of production factors  
'π  Modified profit (the period-internal maximand of firms) 
kσ  Elasticity of substitution between variety-capital and other ordinary capital 
kMδ  Share of other ordinary capital in the capital composite 
R Accumulated number of capital varieties (and of firms and patents)  
σkv Uniform elasticity of substitution applying to all pairs of capital varieties 
H
RX  Production of new ideas 
s1 Elasticity of domestic spillovers 
ViK  Capital variety i 
kviP  User cost index of capital variety i  
H
RP  Price index of the patent 
H
kiX  Output of variety firm i delivered to the domestic market  
W
kiX  Output of variety firm i delivered to the export market 
H
kiP  Domestic market price index of variety i  
W
kP  World market price index of varieties 
kiε  Domestic demand elasticity for capital variety i 
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kim  Mark-up factor for variety firm i 
kvσ  Substitution elasticity between two varieties 
Pkv User cost index of the variety-capital composite  
0U  Discounted period utilities of a representative consumer 
d  Consumption of a representative consumer 
ρ Consumer's rate of time preferences  
PD Consumer price index 
R Nominal interest rate 
W0  Consumer's current non-human wealth + present value of labour income + net transfers 
λ Marginal utility of wealth  
σd Intertemporal elasticity of substitution  
D Aggregate consumption  
N Annual population growth rate 
Di Demand for consumer good i, , 
VDj Aggregate expenditure on CES aggregate j 
0.iω  Budget share of good i in CES aggregate j in period 0 
σj Elasticity of substitution between the two consumer goods in CES aggregate j 
gs Growth rate 
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Figure B.1. The nested structure of the production technology 
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Figure B.2. The nested structure of consumption activities 
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Appendix C 
Policy alternatives 
Alternative 1 is a subsidy αs towards production of new ideas/patents in the R&D industry. The 
representative firm's profit function is then given by  
(C.1)   ( ) ( )
1
1
' 1H H H sR s R Rs
s
cP X X
R
π α= + − . 
From the first-order conditions of the firm’s profit maximization we get the following marginal 
condition 
(C.2)  
( )
( )
1
1
1
s
H H s
R Rs
s
s
cP X
sRα
−
=
+
. 
Alternative 2 is a capital subsidy αs towards the production of capital varieties. The representative 
firm's profit function is then given by 
(C.3)  ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1/' 1 1 sH H H H W W Wsi ki ki s ki ki k s ki kiP X X c X P X c Xπ α α= + − + + −  
The first-order condition for deliveries to the domestic market is given by 
(C.4)   ( ) ( )
1
1
s
H H s
ki ki ki
s
cP m X
sα
−
=
+
 
For deliveries to the export market the world market price equals marginal costs. 
(C.5)  ( ) ( )
1
1
s
W W s
k ki
s
cP X
sα
−
=
+
 
Alternative 3 is a direct subsidy αs towards domestic investments in capital varieties. This acts as a 
production subsidy towards only domestic deliveries. The representative firm's profit function is then 
given by 
(C.6)  ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1/' 1 sH H H H W W Wsi ki ki s ki ki k ki kiP X X c X P X c Xπ α= + − + −  
The first-order condition for deliveries to the domestic market is given by 
(C.7)   ( ) ( )
1
1
s
H H s
ki ki ki
s
cP m X
sα
−
=
+
 
The domestic price is set as a markup over marginal costs and the subsidy αs acts as a reduction in the 
marginal costs. For deliveries to the export market the world market price equals marginal costs. 
